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Abstract:	WhatsApp	messenger	is	arguably	the	most	popular	mobile	app	available	on	all	smart-phones.	Over	one	
billion	people	worldwide	for	free	messaging,	calling,	and	media	sharing	use	it.	In	April	2016,	WhatsApp	switched	to	
a	default	end-to-end	encrypted	service.	This	means	that	all	messages	(SMS),	phone	calls,	videos,	audios,	and	any	
other	 form	of	 information	exchanged	cannot	be	read	by	any	unauthorized	entity	since	WhatsApp	version	2.16.2	
(released	 April	 2016).	 In	 this	 paper	 we	 analyze	 the	 WhatsApp	 messaging	 platform	 and	 critique	 its	 security	
architecture	along	with	a	focus	on	its	privacy	preservation	mechanisms.	We	report	that	the	Signal	Protocol,	which	
forms	the	basis	of	WhatsApp	end-to-end	encryption,	does	offer	protection	against	forward	secrecy,	and	MITM	to	a	
large	 extent.	 Finally,	 we	 argue	 that	 simply	 encrypting	 the	 end-to-end	 channel	 cannot	 preserve	 privacy.	 The	
metadata	can	reveal	 just	enough	information	to	show	connections	between	people,	their	patterns,	and	personal	
information.	
This	paper	elaborates	on	the	security	architecture	of	WhatsApp	and	performs	an	analysis	on	the	various	protocols	
used.	 This	 enlightens	 us	 on	 the	 status	 quo	 of	 the	 app	 security	 and	 what	 further	 measures	 can	 be	 used	 to	 fill	
existing	gaps	without	compromising	the	usability.	We	start	by	describing	the	following	(i)	important	concepts	that	
need	to	be	understood	to	properly	understand	security,	(ii)	the	security	architecture,	(iii)	security	evaluation,	(iv)	
followed	by	a	summary	of	our	work.	Some	of	the	important	concepts	that	we	cover	in	this	paper	before	evaluating	
the	 architecture	 are	 -	 end-to-end	 encryption	 (E2EE),	 signal	 protocol,	 and	 curve25519.	 The	 description	 of	 the	
security	 architecture	 covers	 key	management,	 end-to-end	 encryption	 in	WhatsApp,	 Authentication	Mechanism,	
Message	Exchange,	and	finally	the	security	evaluation.	We	then	cover	importance	of	metadata	and	role	it	plays	in	
conserving	privacy	with	respect	to	whatsapp.	
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1. Introduction	
WhatsApp	messenger	was	started	by	two	ex-Yahoo	employees	(Business	Insider	2015)	and	was	sold	to	Facebook	in	
2014(WhatsApp	Blog	 –	 Facebook	 2016)	 but	 remained	operationally	 independent.	 Since	 then,	 the	 user	 base	 has	
increased	tremendously	and	over	a	billion	users	per	day	now	use	the	app.	As	of	January	2016,	the	average	number	
of	 daily	 messages	 exchanged	 over	 WhatsApp	 is	 reported	 to	 be	 an	 astounding	 34	 billion	 (The	 Verge	 2014).	
WhatsApp	has	 been	 able	 to	 attract	 this	 unprecedented	 success	 because	of	 its	 availability	 on	 all	 popular	mobile	
operating	 systems,	 and	 is	 free	 of	 cost	 (or	 costs	 a	 nominal	 $0.99	 per	 year).	 Free	 calls,	 unlimited	messages,	 and	
media	exchange,	along	with	an	easy	to	operate	interface	make	it	favorable	for	novice	users	as	well.	
However,	as	far	as	security	is	concerned,	WhatsApp	has	come	under	fire	several	times	in	the	past.	The	negligence	
shown	 towards	 making	 the	 application	 secure	 made	 it	 an	 easy	 target	 for	 attackers.	 For	 example,	 in	 2011,	 a	
problem	 was	 found	 in	 the	 app	 verification	 process	 proving	 that	 the	 authentication	 mechanism	 was	 unsecure	
(Schrittwieser	et.	al	2012).	Researchers	were	able	 to	exploit	valid	usage	session	by	 successfully	hijacking	 several	
user	 accounts	 (called	 session	 hijacking).	 This	 allowed	 unauthorized	 access	 where	 an	 attacker	 could	 spoof	 the	
sender	 identification,	 thus	 receiving	messages	 targeted	 to	 the	 victim.	 A	 packet	 sniffer	 could	 then	 intercept	 the	
traffic	and	log	all	communication	details.	All	later	attempts	were	either	a	half-baked	attempt	to	encrypt	messages	
or	 were	 broken	 at	 launch.	 This	 lax	 approach	 continued	 and	 by	 the	 time	 it	 was	may	 2012,	WhatsApp	 was	 still	
sending	messages	in	plain	text,	which	means	there	was	no	encryption	for	any	kind	of	communication.	
	
  
In	 the	wake	of	 increasing	privacy	 concerns	and	 the	war	between	Apple	and	FBI	over	encryption	of	phone	data,	
WhatsApp	 has	 switched	 to	 end-to-end	 encryption.	 This	 has	 enabled	 the	 messenger	 app	 user	 to	 send	 all	
communication	encrypted.	It	is	no	more	easy	for	an	unauthorized	person	to	read	text	messages,	videos,	audios,	or	
files	by	surreptitiously	listening	to	the	communication	as	data	is	no	more	send	in	plaintext.	
	
This	 paper	 elaborates	 on	 the	 security	 architecture	 of	 WhatsApp	 and	 analyzes	 the	 various	 protocols	 used.	 We	
perform	an	extensive	 literature	study	 from	several	online	 resources	on	Whatsapp	and	 related	concepts	and	use	
that	to	understand	the	working	of	the	application	and	its	security	protocols.	Also,	while	whatsapp	is	a	popular	app	
for	 the	mobile	platform,	 its	computer	version	can	be	accessed	via	a	web	browser	or	by	 installing	an	app	for	 the	
windows	or	mac	OS	platform.	Since	a	phone	number	 is	 required	as	 the	primary	 identification	of	 a	user,	 the	QR	
code	needs	to	be	scanned	to	authorize	the	computer	(WhatsApp	FAQ	–	WhatsApp	Web).	
	
We	 also	 take	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 the	 app	 security	 and	 what	 further	 measures	 can	 make	 it	 stronger	 without	
compromising	 usability.	 In	 the	 following	 sections,	 we	 cover	 some	 important	 security	 concepts	 applicable	 to	
WhatsApp,	 understand	 and	 evaluate	 the	 security	 architecture,	 measures	 taken	 to	 ensure	 user	 privacy,	 make	
recommendations	on	improvements,	and	finally	end	with	a	summary	of	our	work.	
	
2.	Security	Fundamentals	
2.1	End-to-End	Encryption	(E2EE)		
This	is	a	system	of	communication,	which	allows	only	the	communicating	parties	to	access	the	messages	because	
the	medium	 is	 encrypted.	 In	 theory,	 no	eavesdropper	 can	access	 the	 cryptographic	 keys	needed	 to	decrypt	 the	
conversation.	 This	 includes	 service	providers	 like	 cellular	 companies,	 ISPs,	 and	app	developers.	 Theoretically,	 an	
adversary	cannot	access	the	transmitted	data	even	after	the	traffic	has	been	intercepted.	This	is	possible	because	
of	 the	various	properties	of	 the	encryption	protocols	used	 for	making	 the	end-to-end	communication	encrypted	
and	 inaccessible	 for	 an	 unauthorized	 user.	 In	 the	 figure	 below,	 the	 communication	 channel	 between	 the	 two	
phones	or	computers	is	encrypted.	
	
	
	
Figure	1	-	E2E	encryption	between	two	smartphones.	
	
2.2	Signal	Protocol	
Signal	 Protocol	 (previously	 Axolotl)	 enables	 end-to-end	 encryption	 in	WhatsApp.	 It	 is	 used	 to	 encrypt	 both	 text	
messages	and	voice	calls	by	using	an	asynchronous	method	under	a	shared	key.	The	protocol	was	chosen	as	it	can	
provide	plausible	deniability	and	forward-secret	asynchronous	communications,	among	other	features,	on	mobile	
devices.	(Praetorian	2015)	
	
2.3	Plausible	deniability	
By	deniability	or	repudiation,	it	means	that	a	message	receiver	can	be	sure	where	the	message	originated	from	but	
cannot	prove	the	identity	of	the	sender.	In	essence,	the	sender	can	deny	being	the	person	who	originally	sent	the	
message	 (Open	Whisper	 Systems	 2013).	 Signal	 protocol	 uses	 a	 compact	 derivative	 of	 the	Off-the-Record	 (OTR)	
protocol	 to	enable	 this	 feature.	Before	we	get	 into	any	 further	details,	 let’s	 first	understand	 the	working	of	 the	
signal	protocol.	
  
Each	 member	 participant	 in	 a	 WhatsApp	 conversation	 has	 a	 long-term	 identity	 key	 that	 they	 use	 to	 sign	 an	
ephemeral	 key.	 This	 ephemeral	 key	 is	 exchanged	 among	members	 to	 calculate	 a	 shared	 secret,	 typically	 using	
Diffie–Hellman	 (D-H)	 key	exchange	method.	D-H	allows	 the	participants	 to	 jointly	 establish	 a	 shared	 secret	 key,	
which	can	then	be	used	to	encrypt	subsequent	communications.		
The	 shared	 secret	 from	 this	 key	 exchange	 is	 used	 to	 derive	 three	 keys	 for	 each	 participant	 -	 a	 sending	 and	 a	
receiving	cipher	key,	and	a	set	of	MAC	keys.	These	MAC	keys	confirm	message	authenticity	and	integrity,	and	are	
included	in	every	transmitted	message.	Notice	here	that	the	MAC	keys	are	subsequently	derived	from	the	original	
shared	key	ensuring	that	the	message	was	indeed	sent	by	the	claimed	sender.	At	the	same	time,	both	the	parties	
are	involved	in	generating	the	shared	key	as	well	as	the	subsequent	MAC	keys	(also	called	ephemeral	keys).	While	
this	keeps	the	message	integrity	intact,	the	authenticity	of	sending	the	message	that	they	originated	can	be	denied	
later.	This	is	because	of	the	shared	key,	which	makes	the	receiver	capable	of	producing	a	sender’s	MAC	key.		
	
2.4	Forward	secrecy	
If	 the	encryption	keys	 from	a	user’s	 smartphone	or	computer	somehow	get	compromised,	a	 fresh	key	 for	every	
new	message	is	issued.	This	prevents	an	adversary	from	not	only	deriving	the	ephemeral	keys	but	also	from	using	
it	to	decrypt	any	message	transmitted	in	the	past.	
	
Signal	Protocol	uses	the	following	types	of	keys:	
1. Identity	 key	 pair,	 a	 long-term	 Curve25519	 key	 pair	 generated	 at	 install	 time	 for	 all	 asymmetric	
cryptographic	operations.		
2. Signed	pre	Key,	a	medium	term	Curve25519	key	pair.	
3. Pre	Keys,	also	Curve25519	keys	but	for	one-time	use.	These	are	used	to	actually	encrypt	the	message.	
	
Signal	Protocol	uses	a	compact	derivative	of	OTR	where	it	uses	D-H	exchange	in	each	key	generation	step	above,	
which	continually	ratchets	the	key	material	forward.	This	is	the	underlying	principle	behind	forward	secrecy	as	the	
keys	 that	 finally	 encrypt	 the	 message	 are	 ephemeral.	 Recording	 the	 encrypted	 traffic	 cannot	 divulge	 the	 key	
material	or	decrypt	previous	messages.	Even	if	a	device	is	physically	compromised,	no	keys	at	any	given	time	are	
stored	on	the	device	that	can	help	an	adversary	decrypt	previously	exchanged	ciphertext.	Note	that	this	property	is	
very	different	from	the	traditional	ways	of	encrypting	data	in	motion	or	at	rest.	In	these	cases,	the	same	key	or	a	
periodically	 changed	 key	 (which	 is	 usually	 a	 slow	 process)	 is	 used	 to	 encrypt	 data.	 This	 makes	 it	 extremely	
important	 to	 store	 the	key	at	a	 secure	 location,	 lest	all	 the	 recorded	messages	ever	exchanged,	and	 sometimes	
with	all	different	parties,	may	get	 into	 the	hands	of	 the	adversary.	By	contrast,	 the	key	exchange	mechanism	 in	
signal	protocol	is	ephemeral.	Hence,	if	a	key	is	ever	compromised	in	the	future,	all	recorded	ciphertext	will	remain	
private.	
	
There	are	other	advantages	for	choosing	signal	protocol.	It	is	a	mobile-friendly	end-to-end	(e2e)	protocol,	which	
can	decrease	the	size	of	packets	by	using	protobufs.	Protobuf,	or	protocol	buffer,	is	a	small	logical	record	of	
information,	containing	a	series	of	name-value	pair	that	offer	an	automated	mechanism	for	serializing	structured	
data.	It	works	similar	to	XML	but	differs	by	being	faster,	smaller,	and	simpler.		
	
2.5	Curve25519	
Elliptic-curve	based	cryptographic	(ECC)	systems	are	public-key	cryptosystems	that	rely	on	the	inability	to	
determine	n	from	Y	=	nX,	where	X	and	Y	are	publicly	known	base	points.	
Curve25519	helps	compute	the	public	part	of	this	equation,	which	is	128-bits	in	length.	
Curve25519	is	also	an	ECC	curve,	which	is	a	variant	of	the	Diffie-Hellman	protocol.	For	this	reason,	Curve25519	can	
be	successfully	implemented	with	the	elliptic	curve	Diffie–Hellman	(ECDH)	key	agreement	scheme.	This	property	
  
enables	Curve25519	to	compute	shared	keys	that	can	be	exchanged	over	unencrypted	channels	as	well.	As	
mentioned	in	earlier	sections,	each	member	on	WhatsApp	has	a	long-term	identity	key	that	is	used	to	calculate	
this	shared	secret.	
	
Curve25519	introduced	by	Daniel	J.	Bernstein	(Bernstein	2006),	computes	very	fast	in	terms	of	key	compression,	
key	validation,	and	timing-attack	protection	among	others.	This	makes	the	curve	a	practical	choice	for	large-scale	
implementation,	as	is	the	case	with	WhatsApp.	
	
3.	Security	Architecture		
Now	that	we	understand	some	key	concepts,	we	can	turn	our	attention	to	the	implementation	and	key	exchanges	
that	take	place	in	WhatsApp.	See	figure	2	for	more	details.	
	
3.1	Key	Management	
	
3.1.1.	End-to-End	Encryption	working	in	WhatsApp	
Each	WhatsApp	user	possesses	a	long-term	key	that	is	stored	on	the	device	memory,	not	readily	accessible	to	the	
user.	This	key	is	used	to	create	another	shared	key	using	which	a	WhatsApp	user	can	securely	communicate	with	
another	use.	A	secure	communication	channel	is	established	between	the	two,	and	it	remains	intact	until	events	
such	as	app	reinstall,	device	change,	etc.	The	following	steps	describe	key	management	in	the	flow	diagram	shown	
in	figure	2.	The	initiating	client	is	called	initiator,	and	the	requesting	client	is	called	the	recipient.	
	
	
Figure	2:	Flow	diagram	of	whatsapp	end-to-end	encryption	
	
1. The	initiator	requests	the	public	identity	key,	public	signed	pre	key,	and	a	single	public	one-time	pre	key	
for	 the	 recipient.	 The	 identity	 key,	 called	 Irecipient	 is	 a	 long-term	curve22519	key	pair.	 The	 signed	pre	
key,	called	Srecipient	is	a	medium-term	curve22519	key	pair,	and	signed	by	Irecipient.	The	one-time	pre-
key,	 called	 Orecipient	 is	 a	 list	 of	 curve22519	 key	 pairs	 mainly	 for	 one	 time	 use.	 All	 these	 keys	 are	
generated	during	installation,	reinstallation,	or	change	of	device.	
2. The	WhatsApp	server	returns	the	requested	public	key	values	to	the	initiating	client.	The	one-time	pre	key	
is	ephemeral,	and	remains	on	the	server	only	until	requested.		
  
3. The	initiator	saves	the	keys	requested	in	step	1	and	generates	an	ephemeral	curve25519	key	pair,	called	
Einitiator,	and	loads	its	own	identity	key,	called	Iinitiator.	
4. Using	 these	 keys	 generated	 and	 requested	 in	 the	 above	 step	 the	 initiator	 can	 now	 calculate	 a	 shared	
secret	with	the	recipient	-		
Master	Key	-	ECDH(Iinitiator,	Srecipient)	||	ECDH(Einitiator,	 Irecipient)	||	ECDH(Einitiator,	Srecipient)	||	
ECDH(Einitiator,	Orecipient)	
This	master	key	 is	used	to	create	subsequent	session	keys	between	the	two	parties.	A	Hashed	Message	
Authentication	Code	(HMAC)-based	key	derivation	 function	 (HKDF)	derives	 the	root	key,	and	chain	keys	
from	the	master	key.	It	takes	master	key	as	the	input	keying	material	and	extracts	from	it	a	fixed-length	
pseudo	random	key.	 	This	key	expands	 into	several	additional	pseudorandom	keys,	resulting	 in	the	root	
and	chain	keys,	both	with	32-byte	value.	
5. The	 server	 contacts	 the	 recipient	 using	 the	member	 id	 lookup	 and	 sends	 session	 information	with	 the	
initiator	-	Einitiator	and	Iinitiator.	
6. Using	this	session	 information,	the	recipient	calculates	at	 its	end	shared	secret,	which	 is	the	master	key	
and	confirms	 integrity	of	 the	message	and	has	been	 sent	unaltered	by	an	authorised	person.	Recipient	
also	deletes	the	ephemeral,	one-time	pre-key,	Orecipient.	
7. 	Using	 the	 chain	 keys	 generated	 in	 previous	 steps,	 parties	 involved	 in	 the	 conversation	 generate	 a	
message	key	of	80-byte	 value.	 This	encrypts	each	message	and	 ratchets	 forward	 the	 chain	 key	used	 to	
derive	 the	 message	 key,	 every	 time	 a	 message	 is	 sent	 in	 a	 given	 session.	 This	 works	 by	 increasing	 a	
counter	that	is	part	of	a	function	deriving	the	chain	key.	This	is	a	key	step	in	providing	forward	secrecy,	as	
the	chain	key	is	no	more	of	use	for	messages	sent	earlier	and	hence	cannot	be	used	to	decrypt	them.	With	
the	 chain	 key	 changing	 with	 every	 message,	 the	 message	 key	 also	 changes	 having	 a	 similar	 effect	 on	
forward	message	encryption.	
	
Message	key	=	HMAC-SHA256(chain	key,	0x01)		
Chain	key	=	HMAC-SHA256(chain	key,	0x02)		
	
WhatsApp	also	uses	QR	code	verification	method	for	out-of-band	user	verification.	The	QR	code	contains,	among	
other	things,	a	32-byte	Irecipient	and	Iinitiator	-	which	are	the	public	identity	keys	for	both	users.	Another	way	to	
get	a	similar	experience	is	by	comparing	a	60-digit	number.		
	
4.	Security	and	Privacy	Evaluation	
Signal	Protocol	drastically	 reduces	 the	possibility	of	having	a	man-in-the-middle	attack.	This	 is	primarily	because	
OTR	 is	 based	on	 a	mechanism	where	 it	 uses	D-H	exchange	 in	 each	 key	 generation	 step	mentioned	earlier.	 This	
continually	ratchets	the	key	material	forward.	For	an	active	adversary	who	has	managed	to	decrypt	the	channel,	
the	integrity	of	the	encryption	keys	can	to	be	traced	all	the	way	back	to	the	original	shared	key,	which	requires	a	
fair	 amount	 of	 time	 and	 key	 tracking.	 One	 can	 be	 assured	 that	 no	 MITM	 attack	 is	 possible	 on	 any	 of	 the	
subsequently	generated	keys.		
	
However,	 a	major	 security	 concern	 is	worth	mentioning	 here.	While	WhatsApp	messages	 are	 secure	 in	 transit,	
most	of	the	endpoint	devices	–	such	as	smartphones,	tablets,	and	computers	–	do	not	encrypt	the	data	residing	on	
them	in	the	same	way	that	Apple	does	with	its	most	recent	iPhone.	WhatsApp	offers	to	backup	messages	likely	on	
a	 cloud	server.	 Some	of	 the	options	given	are	Google	drive,	Apple	 iCloud,	etc.	We	do	not	have	any	 information	
about	message	encryption	on	the	cloud	platform	yet,	unless	WhatsApp	decides	to	share	these	details	soon.	
	
  
Also,	 WhatsApp	 does	 not	 offer	 encryption	 of	 past	 communication	 at	 app	 level,	 which	 can	 expose	 the	 user	
messages	in	case	of	device	theft.	
	
4.1	Privacy	implication	of	plausible	deniability	
The	prevalence	of	global	surveillance	has	caused	much	concern	to	many	users.	Some	of	the	concerns	have	been	
related	to	a	third	party	listening	to	user	conversations,	without	permission.	Another	one	is	being	held	against	a	
message	they	sent	in	the	past	in	the	court	of	law.	
	
Signal	protocol	was	designed	keeping	such	privacy	concerns	in	mind,	among	other	security	issues.	For	this	purpose,	
it	ensures	that	the	message	sender	or	receiver	cannot	be	irrefutably	tied	to	a	particular	message	sent	in	the	past	
by	using	the	various	ratchet	forward	encryption	techniques.	
	
In	the	privacy	domain,	there	have	been	concerns	related	to	user	metadata	as	well.	WhatsApp	encrypts	the	
communication	channel	between	users	using	end-to-end	encryption.	The	metadata	of	the	user	is	encrypted	as	well	
when	data	is	in	motion	on	the	communication	channel	between	various	parties.	It	is	essential	to	understand	that	
information	stored	in	metadata	is	just	as	important	in	preserving	privacy	of	the	users,	as	is	the	data	itself.	The	
company’s	legal	terms	allow	them	to	store	information	associated	with	successfully	delivered	messages	such	as	
time	of	delivery,	mobile	phone	numbers	involved	in	the	messages,	size	of	any	digital	content	swapped	between	
the	two	parties	(Bernstein	2006).	Also,	the	app	persists	the	user	to	share	one's	entire	contact	list	with	the	app.	This	
is	a	way	to	further	gather	information	about	who	is	in	a	particular	social	network	of	a	user.	It	is	like	trading	the	
convenience	of	having	the	app	to	figure	out	who	uses	it	amongst	one’s	contacts	for	giving	up	the	entire	list	of	
which	one	contacts	regularly,	including	those	who	don't	use	the	app.	There	is	still	no	option	of	selectively	adding	
contacts	to	the	WhatsApp	list.	Any	addition	of	this	feature	in	the	future	will	not	help	existing	users	as	they	have	
already	shared	this	detail	with	the	app.	
	
A	smartphone	metadata	reflects	a	wealth	of	details	both	at	the	level	of	individual	calls	and	when	analyzed	in	
aggregate.	Computer	scientists	and	researchers	have	proved	this	a	number	of	times	in	the	past.	It	is	here	where	
WhatsApp	falters.	While	the	metadata	is	encrypted	during	transit,	phone	numbers,	timestamps,	connection	
duration,	connection	frequency,	as	well	as	user	location	are	being	stored	on	the	company’s	servers.	This	metadata	
is	sufficient	to	create	a	profile	and	draw	some	strong	inferences	between	the	communicating	parties.	And	as	we’ve	
seen	very	often,	both	governments	and	hackers	can	get	their	hands	on	the	metadata	if	they	really	go	after	it.	
	
What	advantage	would	Facebook,	the	parent	company	has	in	addition	to	the	metadata	related	information	coming	
via	WhatsApp?	WhatsApp	had	vowed	that	it	would	not	be	selling	advertisements.	However,	there	is	no	condition	
that	can	stop	its	parent	company	from	doing	so	by	using	information	gathered	through	the	whatsapp.	In	
combination	to	one's	activities	on	Facebook,	it	can	potentially	help	create	a	more	accurate	understanding	of	the	
user	behavior,	and	social	interactions	thereby	serving	as	a	strong	measure	of	profiling	for	some	targeted	ads.	This	
is	not	truly	a	major	concern	as	long	as	the	user	sees	ads	that	make	sense	to	them.	Any	change	in	the	content	
delivery	algorithm	can	lead	to	a	very	different	user	experience,	where	in	some	cases	the	user	may	outright	stop	
using	the	app.	
	
For	group	chat,	the	communication	initiator	sends	message	to	the	whatsapp	server,	which	in	turn	distributes	it	to	
all	the	group	members.	This	is	a	very	easy	way	of	for	Facebook	to	learn	all	about	ones	social	interactions	and	
communities.	A	lot	can	be	deduced	by	performing	some	kind	of	traffic	analysis	just	by	using	the	metadata	like	from	
the	message	volume	exchanged.	
	
  
	
In	August	2016,	WhatsApp	changed	its	terms	of	privacy	where	it	stated	that	it	plans	to	transfer	user	data	to	its	
parent	company,	Facebook.	It	had	earlier	promised	that	this	data	would	not	be	disclosed	or	used	for	marketing	
purposes.		But	now	it	will	share	user	account	information	with	Facebook	and	the	Facebook	family	of	companies,	
like	the	phone	number	the	user	used	as	a	primary	identifier.	The	companies	intend	to	use	WhatsApp	account	
information	to	show	users	"more	relevant	ads	on	Facebook"	and	to	send	users	marketing	messages	via	WhatsApp.	
A	phone	number	is	like	a	digital	social	security	number	(EPIC	-	WhatsApp).	It	can	uniquely	identify	a	person	as	this	
information	is	provided	every	time	when	filling	up	forms	for	various	purposes.	It	can	also	connect	various	sources	
of	data,	like	health	records,	financial	data,	and	education,	online	presence,	etc.	and	create	a	full	profile	of	a	person.	
	
Metadata	can	also	provide	enough	information	about	the	user	who	relies	on	the	platform	provider	to	deliver	
content.	This	content	can	sometimes	lead	to	influencing	their	opinion,	for	example	political	opinions.	During	the	
US	presidential	campaigns	taking	place	in	2016,	advertisements,	videos,	or	posts	reached	out	to	a	fairly	wide	
audience.	The	coverage	provided	by	Facebook	is	unparalleled	in	comparison	to	the	coverage	provided	by	any	other	
platform.	Ones	that	focus	too	much	on	a	certain	negative	or	positive	aspect	of	republican	candidate	Donald	Trump	
or	democrat	candidate,	Hillary	Clinton	can	lead	a	user	to	create	a	bias	view	of	the	candidate	over	a	period	of	time.	
	
5.	Conclusion	
WhatsApp	has	attracted	a	lot	of	attention	because	of	its	 large-scale	usage	of	end-to-end	encryption,	a	first	of	 its	
kind.	 The	 purpose	 it	 to	 re-instate	 users	 trust	 in	 using	 chat	 apps	 without	 worrying	 about	 privacy	 and	 security	
concerns.	 In	 this	paper,	we	went	over	 the	various	 fundamental	of	advanced	cryptography	protocols	 that	enable	
the	 various	 security	 and	 privacy	 properties	 of	 whatsapp.	 We	 discussed	 these	 features	 and	 how	 successful	
whatsapp	has	been	by	deploying	them	in	their	security	architecture.	We	also	went	over	the	privacy	concerns	that	
still	remain	due	to	metadata	remaining	unencrypted	and	within	the	territory	of	the	app	provider.		
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